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1. See, Sunga, L. (1997) The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Develop-
ments in codification and implementation, The Hague: Kluwer.
2. Exemplified by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (in the
Hague), and moves towards an international criminal court see, “A Permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court” www.Undp.Org/missions/netherlands/ICC.htm.
3. The comparative examination of criminal trial procedure within the context of
internationalisation might be best achieved through comparative contextual analysis. Such a
methodology presents the potential for avoiding many of the pitfalls of the comparative
project in socio-legal research. For a discussion of comparative contextual analysis see,
Findlay, M. (1999) The Globalisation of Crime, Cambridge: CUP pp.6–8.
4. For instance, the need to try war criminals identified as a consequence of more regular
global military interventions such as in Bosnia and Serbia. See, Cotic, D. (1994) “A Critical
Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” in Criminal Law Forum
5/2–3:223–236. Also note that the recent U.S. opposition to the establishment of an
International Criminal Court is founded on the American view of an inextricable
connection between any such court and the mandate and interests of the UN Security
Council. (See, n.9 below).
5. Driven as they are by the foreign policy concerns of the United States and Western
Europe, even more than those of world agencies such as the United Nations. See,
Goldstone, R. (1996) “Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth commissions and
international criminal tribunals” in New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics 28/3:485–503.
SYNTHESIS IN TRIAL PROCEDURES?
THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
MARK FINDLAY*
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONALISATION
CRITICAL to analysing the recent synthesis of criminal trial procedures is
an understanding of the internationalisation of criminal law and pro-
cedure.1 As well as the creation of international tribunals2 to investigate
and try crimes of world significance, there is emerging an international
jurisprudence on criminal law (and procedural hybrids to support and
develop this) which require integrated analysis.3
It would appear that the present pace and form of such change is largely
the product of global political imperatives.4 The nature of these impera-
tives5 has necessitated the operation of penal sanctions within two broad
and divergent Western criminal justice traditions (Anglo-American
common law and Western European civil law). The speed with which
these developments have occurred has meant that the evolution of
international criminal institutions and procedures appears expedient
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6. It is also important to recognise that the structure of these international institutions and
the derivation of the procedures under which they will operate have been the subject of
intense political lobbying. See, Scharf, M.(1999) “The Politics Behind the U.S. Opposition
to the International Criminal Court” in New England International and Comparative Law
Annual www.nesl.edu/annual/vol5/scharf.htm.
7. This is an important policy purpose of a major research project (The International
Criminal Trial Project) currently under way in the Centre for Legal Research, Nottingham
Law School.
8. Particularly with international war crimes adjudication.
9. Opposition to such developments rests on the preference by countries like the U.S. and
China to use their UN Security Council veto to negotiate and control prosecutions, rather
than as a general resistance to the concept. While the Americans endorse the court concept
they seem unwilling to relinquish their dominance of international institutions through an
independent prosecution process, and have put the position that the proposal for an
international criminal court will fail without their support. In the U.S. view the connection
between political priorities and the rule of law is clear at an international level. See, Schaffer,
D (1998) “Address Before the Southern Californian Working Group on the International
Criminal Court” in www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/genocide/
iccus.html.
10. This concept of a “just” war not only regularly appeared in the rhetoric of NATO for
justifying its hostilities in Kosovo, but has since been implicit in delineating the “crimes” of
the Serbians from the necessities of NATO forces – see also, Ulmen, G. (1996) “Just Wars or
Just Enemies” in Telos 109:99–112.
11. See, Robinson, D. (1997) “Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs: Major developments in
1997 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” in Canadian
Yearbook of International Criminal Law, XXXV:179–213.
rather than experimental, rationalised rather than rational.6 By examin-
ing the possibility, nature and extent of procedural synthesis these
impressions will be tested. Consequentially it should be credible to
suggest ways in which a theory and planned practice of penal sanctioning
and criminal procedure should underpin such developments.7
The context of the criminal trial has been selected as a focus for
procedural comparison because of its essential connection with the
negotiation and imposition of penal sanctions, a primary political purpose
behind the internationalisation process.8 The global political push for an
international criminal law, and its institutions,9 recently has relied on the
connection between the image of a “just” international military inter-
vention,10 and the necessity to punish “crimes” which either justified that
intervention or were perpetrated by those opposed to it. At the
conclusion of the military context, the resolution of these “crimes” is
transferred into the courtroom and the trial.11 Further, the trial is perhaps
a slightly less contentious domain where the two principal procedural
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12. See, Tochilovsky, V. (1998) “Trial in International Criminal Jurisdictions: Battle or
scrutiny” in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 6/1:55–59.
13. This is not to downplay the significant differences between civil law and common law
evidentiary rules and trial practice, the comparative analysis of which will form the basis of
much of the research to follow. See, for instance. Nsereko, D. (1994) “Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” in Criminal Law
Forum 5/2–3:507–555.
14. For a discussion of the comparative trial “theatre” in respect of a murder trial see,
McKillop, B. (1997) Anatomy of a French Murder Case, Sydney: Hawkins Press.
15. See, King, F. & La Rosa, A. (1997) “International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: current survey—the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994–1996” in
European Journal of International Law 8/1:123–179.
16. Such as between English and American common law, German and French civil law.
styles confront one another.12 The same could not be said, for instance, of
the pre-trial phase.13
The selection of the trial as a centre for comparative criminal
procedure research may be criticised on the basis that in neither
procedural style (civil law or common law) is the trial exemplary of
criminal justice at work. In common law the vast majority of prosecutions
are settled through guilty pleas and never go to trial. In the civil law
traditions most prosecutions are diverted or settled through plea during
the detailed investigation process preceding the trial. Aligned with this
issue of procedural representativeness is a comparative dilemma. Trials
differ in form and significance between the two styles. For instance, the
adversarial process in common law trial means that the visual theatre of
the trial through the examination of witnesses in person may appear in
stark contrast to the dossier-led trial in civil law, where most of the action
has occurred beyond the court-room.14
Recognising these challenges to the comparative project, the value of
the trial as the procedural focus for this research remains. Across both
procedural styles serious crime is tried. Serious crime is also far more
likely to be defended and therefore tried. Serious crimes and their trial
have produced many of the procedural safeguards around which criminal
justice traditions have grown. In practice there may prove to be less that
divides the adversarial from the inquisitorial trial. For instance, the more
complex the case the more that the significance of documentary evidence
will prevail. And there is little doubt that the ideology of criminal justice
in both traditions takes the trial as its manifestation. This is confirmed by
the paramount place of the trial in the institutionalisation of international
criminal justice.
The internationalisation of criminal trial institutions has necessitated
debates about synthesising two western styles of criminal procedure (civil
law and common law in origin).15 This, however, should not be
approached as a straightforward, bifurcated consideration of separate
criminal justice traditions. Significant derivations within each main style16
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1093/iclq/50.1.26
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 09 May 2017 at 08:33:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
29Synthesis in Trial Procedures?JANUARY 2001]
17. For an analysis of the inextricable association between methods of legal regulation,
and domestic and global political interests, see, Findlay, M., (1999) The Globalisation of
Crime, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; chap. 1.
18. See for instance the U.S. position on the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court, in Everard T (1994) “An International Criminal Court: Recent proposals
and American concerns” in Pace Uni School of Law Int’l Law R 6:121, also Scharf M. (1995)
“The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court” in Duke J of Comp & Int’l
Law 6/1:167.
19. Richard Vogler warns against this in his description of French criminal procedure.
See, Hatchard, J., Huber, B. & Vogler, R. (eds.) (1996) International Criminal Procedure
London: BIICL; chap 1.
(and the political systems they support) make the comparative evaluation
and exploration of actual and potential synthesis intricate. Such analysis,
in a wider comprehensive context than is possible in this article, will
involve more than merely the exploration of broad legal styles. It will
require comparative research within the realms of politics, policy and
politicisation, at domestic and global levels.17
A convincing consideration of internationalised criminal law, pro-
cedure and institutions (controversial as this now is18) generates the need
to disentangle the principal competing procedural styles, to test the
nature and location of the important points of difference during the trial,
and to speculate on the potentials for synthesis. In order to achieve this
the trial process itself may need to be reduced to its significant sites for
decision-making, and the manner in which discretion can be exercised
should be explored in comparative procedural terms. Discretion could be
the key to institutional and procedural harmonisation.
It might be argued that a consideration of competing procedural styles
is better mounted from the distinction between accusatorial and inquisi-
torial traditions, rather than from the origins of common or civil law. Most
legal systems now operate procedural hybrids, and it is wrong to assume
any artificial atmosphere of commonality between the procedural
versions of common law or civil law trial practice. This said, it might be
equally misleading to deny the accusatorial dimensions of civil law
(particularly at the trial proper) through an over emphasis on its
inquisitorial pre-trial stages.19 It is suggested that the consideration of
difference and synthesis of procedural styles need not be limited to
origins or to the manner in which evidence is elicited. Both should be
appreciated, along with the unique position of different trial models in
order to create a more realistic and sympathetic framework for
distinction.
Wide-ranging procedural and institutional analysis is beyond the
purpose of this paper. What follows will more modestly identify
suggestions of procedural synthesis from the documentary foundations of
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20. In particular the Rules of Procedure (1994—as amended) of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (1999)
discussed as Part 6 of the Rome Statute for the creation of an International Criminal Court
(ICC). For a discussion of the progress of negotiations about the ICC see, Hall, K. (1998)
“The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court” in American Journal of International Law 92/2:331.
21. For a discussion of the use of style see Findlay, M. & Zvekic, U. (1993) Alternative
Policing Styles, Deventer: Kluwer. In the present context style enables some movement
away from simple distinctions on the basis of origin, or the process for eliciting evidence.
22. In a general sense this knowledge will need to be assumed of the reader.
Unfortunately we are not able to recommend a competent single text which adequately
identifies the essential features of the two systems for the purposes of comparison. See,
Reichel, P. (1999) Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, New York: Prentice Hall;
Ingraham, B. & Verin, J. (1987) The Structure of Criminal Procedure, Conn.: Greenwood.
important international criminal tribunals.20 In addition, the procedural
direction of certain hearings out of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will face brief analysis in order that
suggestions of synthesis in practice are identified. The paper will conclude
with some tentative predictions about the future of procedural synthesis
and its utility as a focus for trial analysis.
In preparation for the comparative exercise it may be useful to discuss
the manner in which concepts such as synthesis and difference are to be
approached. As well, some tentative thoughts on procedural traditions as
comparative tools may prove useful.
STYLES 21 OF CRIMINAL TRIAL
CONSISTENT with what will be said about difference and synthesis, legal
styles are conceptualised in what follows, as multi-faceted and dynamic
phenomena. We are not working from pure models of common law and
civil law trial procedure, nor are we assuming that these logically emerge
from single jurisprudential traditions. The concept of style is carefully
chosen because it elicits notions that are contemporary while built on
traditions, dynamic while possessing common components, and influen-
tial while being susceptible to influence.
The adoption of style rather than tradition as a way to describe the
competing procedural systems in our trial analysis is intended to
encompass derivations and hybrids which claim their origins in a
particular style, yet manifest a style of their own or a significant recasting
of the originating style in question.
Style suggests a way of doing things as much as the thing itself. It
tolerates contrary interpretations and tastes. It is not omnipotent or
neutral. But above everything else it is a “living” concept, which could
equally be said of the criminal trial.
Essential for the procedural comparison is a clear understanding of the
differences between the two principal trial procedures, and recent
debates regarding their synthesis.22 From this foundation it should be
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23. See Runciman W.G., (1994) Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1991–1993,
London: HMSO; also the work of the Australian Law Reform Commission on comparative
civil procedure.
24. Damaska, M., (1986) Two Faces of Justice and Authority: A comparative approach to
the legal process, New Haven: Yale University Press; Zeidler, N., (1981) “Evolution of the
Adversary System: As comparison some remarks on the investigatory system of pro-
cedure”, in 55 Aust Law J 390; Goldstein & Marcus, (1987) “The Myth of Judicial
Supervision in the Three ‘Inquisitorial’ Systems: France, Italy and Germany’, in 87 Yale LJ
240; Volkman-Schluk, (1981) “Continental Criminal Procedure: Myth and Reality”, in 9
Am J Cr L 1; McKillop, B., (1997) The Anatomy of a French Murder Trial, Sydney: Hawkins
Press.
25. Leigh, L.,“Liberty and Efficiency in the Criminal Process: The significance of models”,
in (1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 516.
26. See Findlay, 1999, op. cit. n.3.
27. See Walker, C. & Starmer, K., (1998) Justice in Error, London: Blackstone Press;
Carrington, K. (et al) (eds.) (1991) Travesty: Miscarriages of Justice, Sydney: Pluto Press.
28. Note the comments of the Woolf Report in relation to the failings of civil justice and
their remedy—Woolf, H. (1996) Access to Justice: Final report to the Lord Chancellor on the
civil justice system in England and Wales, London: HMSO.
possible to speculate on the viability of models for international criminal
trial procedure and their primary components, such as is evidenced in the
aspirations for an International Criminal Court (ICC).
Recent interest in the synthesis between common law and civil law
procedures has either emerged from law reform initiatives,23 or broad
theoretical analysis.24 In addition, there has been political and pro-
fessional speculation, particularly in the common law world, regarding
the managerial potential in adopting elements of the civil law criminal
procedure. The largely unsatisfactory nature of debate and inquiry has
tended to eulogise one model over another, or suggested the ad hoc
transplanting of preferred features from one to the other. As Leigh
observes,25 a productive analysis of criminal procedures with a view to
efficiency and effectiveness requires more than a binary comparative
analysis. It must be contextual in a detailed sense, and empirical at valid
levels of comparison. Further, as we argue for comparative analysis more
generally,26 it must only proceed out of initial detailed research within
either context to be compared. This is the essence of comparative
contextual analysis, and for the purpose of evaluating distinctly different
legal styles it is both instructive and crucial.
Recently identified failings of the criminal justice process27 have
provided a sometimes-political motivation for reconsidering the signifi-
cance and applicability of foreign justice models.28 Also, managerialist
approaches to the existence and operation of criminal procedure and
justice institutions have promoted speculation on reform through
“cherry-picking” the other tradition. However, an absence of detailed
and contextual knowledge about the way these models operate, and the
ideological context within which they exist, have made the debate
artificial and abstract. A unique dimension of the comparative project is
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29. A unique opportunity for this is through examining the forces at work in the evolution
of the international criminal court and its proposed procedures.
30. Such identification can be achieved through an analysis of enabling documentation
and procedural rules, but will be more convincing if tested through examination of trial
transcripts and observation of trial practice.
its potential to ground aspirations for law reform in an understanding of
the criminal trial in its practical context, beyond models and rhetoric.29
SYNTHESIS AND DIFFERENCE—IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL PARADIGMS
IN any comparative exercise several central paradigms will bind the
methodology and reverberate through the aspirations for the analysis.
These paradigms will no doubt themselves develop meanings and
material presence relative to the nature of the comparative project. With
synthesis and difference there is a need for care in the treatment of what
appears to be a straightforward dichotomy. At their more complex
renditions efforts towards synthesis may expose difference, and the
peripheral nature of claims for difference may invite synthesis.
Difference
While seeking to confront and examine procedural difference, the
comparative procedural exercise should not be satisfied by (or limited to)
simple dichotomies as its object of interest. Here we tend to look at
difference as a matter of degree.
Either major legal style has its jurisdictional derivations. These
represent commonality and difference. It will be impossible to engage the
detail of this within the limits of this paper, particularly with a form of
analysis which tends to construct (and rely upon) some general points of
difference in order to advance the comparative project.
The treatment of difference must be seen within the wider method-
ology of comparative contextual analysis. In this regard the internal
consistency governing legal procedural styles needs to be recognised and
worked within. The creation of difference through the juxtaposition of
opposing language and ideology is not of itself helpful where practical
outcomes such as the trial are of interest. As actual differences emerge, or
where the potential for difference at other levels of comparison is
suggested, this will present an opportunity for critical evaluation of
synthesis. Other contexts for comparison occur between a particular style
and its derivations or hybrids, and then more specifically between the two
major legal procedural styles engaging contemporary international
debate.
In order to enable comparison, common procedural sites need to be
located within trials.30 Interestingly, this is where the comparative
analysis of procedural difference crucially depends on uniformity and
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31. This is particularly the case with terminology and trial language, as well as with the
professional presence of the principal trial players.
commonality within and across stages of the trial (style to style).31 These
sites will focus on principal points of decision-making in the trial and the
players involved. Another common theme to lubricate the exploration of
procedural difference in criminal justice is the exercise of discretion.
Discretion may also highlight some interesting degrees of difference in
the operation of comparable sites for decision-making within different
trial environments.
The use of procedural sites (or sites for decision-making) as the
comparative context for exploring procedural difference provides a
practical opportunity to test the reality of difference. For example, it is
suggested that crucial to the role of the prosecution and defence counsel,
and the checks and balances of judicial discretion, is the form in which
evidence is presented at trial. If, rather than a reliance on oral testimony,
the lawyers and the court work largely from documentary evidence
wherein lies a common and largely uncontested basis of information, then
the professional players in the trial are faced with very different decisions
than those before their counterparts in a common law trial. However, is it
the form of evidence, or the manner in which legal professionals have
traditionally addressed it which produces these differences in roles and
decision-making? At the pre-trial phase in inquisitorial procedures, it is
important to construct a reliable dossier which prosecution and defence
can contest or can use as the basis for preparation for trial. There is a
danger that police involvement in constructing this dossier may not be
open and transparent and may not be adequately controlled. This may
hinder the defence at trial. Prosecutorial or judicial responsibility over the
creation of the dossier may not be adequate to cure this. This is not
simply, therefore, explained by reference to different evidentiary forms.
The construction of convincing distinctions of difference may need to
go beyond the confines of the trial, as well as recognising the manner in
which eventual procedural difference is generated and maintained.
Synthesis
Synthesis, in any case, works at several levels, which may make its
realisation somewhat illusory. There can be mechanical and administra-
tive synthesis while overriding ideologies remain apart. Synthesis can
appear to be achieved in practice through the exercise of discretion in
situations where procedural rules are different. Synthesis can be imposed
through the creation of new rules which do not necessarily accord with
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32. Despite the fact that, for instance, the Statute of the International Tribunal (for the
Former Yugoslavia) (SIT) in Article 15 invites its judges to adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for the working of the Tribunal, one might suspect that where these rules differ
substantially from the experience of any individual judge these may tend to be reinterpreted
in practice. An analysis of Trial and Appeal Chamber judgments may reveal this.
33. SIC Art. 21 (2).
34. SIC Art. 21 (1).
trial experience.32 Synthesis may be expected through compromise,
whereas the professionals involved in the trial process may regularly
return to their original legal styles.
Synthesis is a reflexive referent for difference. Having said this, simple
dichotomies between procedural difference and potential harmony might
only be arguable at the level of modelling. In analysing synthesis it is
important also to be aware of those imperatives which prevent synthesis
and mask difference. Failure to achieve synthesis will say as much about
competing procedural styles as can models for its achievement.
It may be that the operational reconciliation of procedural difference
becomes the real stuff of wider comparative procedural analysis. Rec-
onciliation may tend to also disclose the problematic nature of procedural
synthesis at various levels of operation.
Synthesis at the Level of Trial Ideologies
At the risk of moving initially away from the work of the trial, aspirations
for a common trial ideology may identify points of practice where
synthesis will be difficult to achieve. Often these will exist at sites where
the governing ideology is most dogmatic or unconditional. Also, it is
common in both procedural styles that prevailing justice ideologies tend
to mask contradictions between principle and practice.
Commonly the ideological dissonance (at international procedural
levels) is either understated or simply not fully thought through. This may
be a factor of the political atmosphere in which the existence of
international criminal justice institutions has been negotiated. It also
might suggest that, as for both procedural styles, essential elements of
their justice ideology are either inconsistent, or difficult to realise. An
example is with precedent, the principle on which common law judicial
reasoning is said to rest. For instance, it is proposed for the ICC that “the
court shall apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions”.33 Complicating with this, the Trial and Appeal Chambers
need to recognise those rules of process within their own legislative basis,
then applicable treaties and principles of international law, and failing
these “general principles of law derived . . . from national laws of legal
systems of the world . . . provided that these are not inconsistent with (the
court’s statutes and international law)”.34 Add to this the requirement to
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35. Norrie, A. (1993) Crime Reason and History: A critical introduction to criminal law,
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
36. Article 21 (3).
37. Rule 42 (A) (iii). No reference in the Statute or the Rules is made to any inferences
which the judge or prosecutor may draw if silence is claimed. See also the SIC Art. 67(1)(g).
38. SIT Art. 21(3)(g).
39. The right to the unsworn “dock statement” has been removed (which is contrary to the
proposed protection in the ICC – SIC Art. 67 (1)(h)). Judges are also given some restricted
opportunity to make adverse comment on an accused’s refusal to answer questions in
certain circumstances. See, for instance, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ss.34,
36, 37. Also, note the discussion in Murray v. DPP (1992) 97 Cr. App. Rep. 151; R v.
Martinez-Tabon [1994] 2 All E.R. 90.
40. For a discussion of this in the context of Article 6 of the European Convention see,
Saunders v. UK (1977) 23 E.H.R.R 313.
interpret law consistent with internationally acknowledged human rights
and there will operate a rather qualified version of precedent, if at all.
Even if precedent were to govern international judicial decision-making
in the criminal jurisdiction it would be essentially influenced by the
contesting notions of the law which come before the trial chambers from
their origins in different traditions. Consistency then would not be
created in any common law sense through a simple application of
precedent. And what is to happen to legal interpretation as precedent
conventions take time to be set?
Even in those procedural styles which declare governance through the
doctrine of precedent, what Norrie refers to as the process of judicial
rationality shines through.35 The essential place of judicial discretion in all
trial procedures necessitates that judicial efficiency will prevail as a source
of authority for trial decision-making.
Criminal trials in both traditions recognise the special position of the
accused. The presumption of innocence is testimony to this. The Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (SIT)
declares that the accused shall be innocent until proven guilty.36 As well,
the accused is accorded the right to remain silent37 and he/she is not
compelled to testify against himself or confess his guilt.38 While these
protections appear to comply with international instruments such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they may be seen as
contradictory to the practice of both procedural styles, and may be waived
even in the practice of the Tribunal. For instance, in England the right to
silence has recently been curtailed.39 In most civil law traditions, while the
presumption of innocence may be accepted, it is expected that the
accused will be an initial witness in his/her defence and that his/her
testimony will answer the inquisition. With charges relating to crimes
where the special knowledge of the accused is recognised, in either
tradition the presumption against self-incrimination may be waived.40
Even for the ICTY, the Rules provide opportunity to require answers
which may be self incriminatory, with the provision that on objection the
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41. SIT Rule 90 (E).
42. This is taken even further from the civil law tradition when the SIC protects against
the imposition on the accused of “any reversal of the burden of proof, or any onus of
rebuttal”—SIC Art. 67 (1)(i).
43. Cf., for instance, Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s.101, Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 s.28 (2);
Public Order Act 1986 s.6 (5).
44. SIT Art. 12.
45. SIT Art. 13.
46. Ibid.
47. The role of the Security Council and the General Assembly in filling casual judicial
vacancies, appointing other trial professionals, disciplining professional misconduct, and
ensuring the primacy of the tribunal or court against those of national jurisdictions makes
the bond a more operational one. Similar criticisms could be raised in relation to the
independence of the prosecutor.
48. Art. 7 (1).
49. Art. 25 (2).
witness will be protected from criminal prosecution supported by this
evidence (except for perjury).41
Under article 66(2) of the proposed Statute of the International
Criminal Court (SIC) the onus is placed on the prosecutor to prove the
guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”. While this is pro-
cedurally consistent with the presumption of innocence it will require a
significant shift in the inquisitorial role of procurators in civil law
traditions.42 As a universal rule43 it also stands in contrast with develop-
ments in common law jurisdictions to impose the onus of denying guilt on
an accused for specific offences, through devices such as presumptions
regarding knowledge and possession, or through strict liability.
Independence for trial professionals is a common aspiration within
both procedural styles. The construction of international tribunals is said
to rest on the independent judiciary.44 The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is constituted by a bench
selected through a complex election process designed to ensure the
widest representation from UN States.45 Its statute (SIT) specifically
requires “adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the
world”.46 Yet where the procedural style has the judiciary elected through
a politically initiated ballot, such as this, the independent presence and
operational status of the international judiciary might be impugned. For
instance, both with the ICTY and the proposed International Criminal
Court (ICC), issues of delegated authority and the role of the UN Security
Council in facilitating prosecutions and enforcing judgments make the
separation from international political instrumentality somewhat
illusory.47
Another important ideological premise for the criminal trial is that of
individual criminal responsibility. The SIT48 and the SIC49 each express
this principle. Once said, both statutes proceed to allow for vicarious
liability, complicity, and to deny the excuse of superior orders or office. A
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50. For instance, SIT Art. 7. Another indicator of this is the limitation on the jurisdiction
of these tribunals only over “natural persons”.
51. SIT Arts. 2–5.
52. SIC Art. 30.
53. The grounds for excluding liability as set out in Art 31 of SIC seem to anticipate this.
54. See Norrie, A. (1993) Crime, History and Reason, London: Butterworths.
55. The term prosecutor here, while distinctly different in many ways, is used for
convenience to also refer to procurators.
practical reason for the ascription to individual liability here is to avoid
prosecutions directed against the State or any official capacity.50
Either through the definition of the offences covered by the tribunal51
or by special reference to mental elements required,52 intention is
designated as the mental state required for criminal responsibility. This
may appear a logical outcome when the serious offence focus of
international tribunals is analysed. However, if for instance the law on
complicity in either tradition is to be applied, then liability through
common purpose will challenge such a narrow reading of criminal
responsibility and capacity.53
At a procedural level one of the major ideological hurdles for synthesis
appears to be the requirement for fair trial. This obviously emerges from a
“rights climate” which is compatible with the international requirements
for the criminal trial. But within common law styles, for example, where
recognition of the rights of the accused has either proceeded from broad
statements of often-contradictory principle,54 or is constructed against
challenges to justice, a coherent representation of the essential elements
in fair trial is illusive.
The search for synthesis at the level of ideology (and its impact in
practice) seems to reveal:
— some divergence between the ideology of international criminal
procedure and that of one or both the competing procedural
styles;
— some divergence between the ideology of international criminal
procedure and that of one or both styles in practice;
— some inconsistency within the international procedural hybrids;
and
— examples of where harmony of procedural ideology may mask
temptations for difference in practice.
Synthesis of Trial Personalities
A prominent area of procedural difference between the two styles is the
role and function of the prosecutor.55 In adversarial trial traditions the
prosecutor is responsible for the presentation of the case against the
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56. Obviously, as with so many statements for the purposes of broad comparison, this
requires qualification. For example, the offices of the Attorney General, and the District
Attorney in U.S. jurisdictions have extensive investigation as well as prosecution functions.
In many other common law jurisdictions, in the lower courts prosecutions may be carried
out by investigation agencies such as the police.
57. This initiating role is an extension of the powers of the prosecutors in many civil law
settings.
58. Art. 51 (1).
59. This is not to be confused with the common law process of committal which concludes
after charge and determines whether the prosecution case is fit for trial. This might be seen
as a stage at which the court further aligns itself with the protection of the rights of the
accused.
60. In certain jurisdictions, such as Scotland, this has progressed to the point of formal
determinations of guilt and penalty on consent without proceeding to trial. See Duff, P.
(1993) “The Prosecutor Fine and Social Control: The introduction of the fiscal fine in
Scotland”, British Journal of Criminology 33/4: 481.
61. See Rule 9 of SIT. Non-compliance with this request is enforced by the Security
Council—Rule 11 SIT.
62. See Rules 39–41 SIT.
accused but may have little to do with the investigation of the matter.56
Civil law trial traditions are heavily reliant on the production of pre-trial
documentary evidence arising from the investigations of the prosecutor.
In each setting the prosecutor is crucial to trial process and outcomes.
In the international tribunals the prosecutor is represented as indepen-
dent and, to confirm this, the office of the prosecutor is empowered to
initiate investigations.57 Even so, it is envisaged that information which
would form the basis of an investigation will be passed over to the
prosecutor either from local jurisdiction’s earlier commenced proceed-
ings, or from other bodies within the international community such as the
Security Council.
The international prosecutor is the formal sieve for matters proceeding
to further investigation and trial. For instance, proposed for the ICC is the
requirement that if the prosecutor initially concludes there is a “reason-
able basis to proceed with the investigation” he or she makes application
to a Pre-trial Chamber of the court to authorise the investigation.58 At this
stage there is some formal symmetry in the prosecutorial relationship of
the court and the prosecutor.59
In the international setting the prosecutor is given the right to defer and
divert, which is an area of expansion in the authority of the prosecutors in
both procedural systems.60 Article 16 of the SIC interestingly gives the
Security Council a limited right of intervention over the investigation, to
defer its commencement or processing. The prosecutor also has the right
to request (and indeed require) the deferral of local jurisdictional
investigations or criminal proceedings.61 This is usually to enable the
precedence of the jurisdiction of the international tribunal.
The powers given to international prosecutors to conduct investi-
gations62 are largely represented by police powers in common law
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63. As enunciated, for instance, in Rules 42–43 SIT.
64. Art 52. For a discussion of the functions and powers of the pre-trial chamber see, Art
57.
65. Rule 47 (A). It should be noted that particularly in relation to the Tribunal’s early
hearings there was some generality in the description of charges in the indictment. This may
have been a product of the broad construction of offences in the Statute and the absence of
judicial interpretation as to the elements of these offences.
66. Rule 50 (A).
jurisdictions. It might be argued that the international (and largely civil
law) role of the prosecutor as investigator inhibits the potential for a
critical separation of powers between policing and prosecution. However,
this might equally be justified on the basis that the prosecutor may better
ensure compliance with the rights and protections of the accused.63
Another area of difference in relation to the prosecutor is his/her
relationship with the judicial officer. In common law traditions (in theory
at least) the magistrate or judge should be no more well disposed to either
side of the case. Particularly with investigating magistrates in the civil law
styles, they also act as prosecutors or could have worked with the
prosecutor in the earlier investigation and preparation of the case. This
close relationship is envisaged in the workings of the ICC “Pre-trial
Chamber”. For the ICC it is proposed that a “unique investigative
opportunity” may be taken through the facilitation of the Pre-trial
Chamber. That chamber may, amongst other things, order measures for
recording proceedings, appointing an expert to assist the investigation,
and even nominate a judge of the Pre-trial Chamber to “observe and
make recommendations or orders regarding the collection and preser-
vation of evidence and the questioning of persons”.64 The Pre-trial
Chamber can act on its own initiative regarding investigations. Even in
the most intrusive common law pre-trial hearings this would never be
envisaged.
This relationship is compounded through the process of settling
indictments for international trials. In the ICTY, for instance, once the
prosecutor is satisfied that “there is sufficient evidence to provide
reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”,65 an indictment shall be prepared
by the prosecutor and sent to the registry for “confirmation by a judge”.
The confirmation process occurs in trial chambers with the prosecutor
addressing the judge. The judge can confirm or dismiss any count in the
indictment and dismissal will allow for the introduction of a new
indictment with the benefit of additional supporting material. If there is
amendment of an indictment after its judicial confirmation leave must be
sought from the confirming or trial chamber.66 Withdrawal of an
indictment after confirmation also requires leave.
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67. This onus on the prosecutor is recapitulated for instance in SIC Art. 66 (2).
68. This may be supported by a written record of interview, and physical or documentary
exhibits. However their admission as evidence may depend on the process through which
oral testimony is examined.
69. This may include the transcripts of testimony from witnesses, and may be confirmed or
elaborated by witnesses examined in person during the trial.
70. It has been suggested that this might reflect the preferred practice of the prosecutors,
most of whom seem to have come from a common law tradition.
71. It should be remembered that for this Tribunal, and as proposed for the ICC, there is
detailed opportunity for closed hearings, the delivery of testimony through video facilities
and the de-identification of witnesses—see, SIC Arts. 64 (7), 68, 69.
72. Rule 85. Such entitlement is qualified in the common law styles and may not exist for
the defence at least in certain civil law trial proceedings.
73. SIC Art.64 (8)(b).
Common to both traditions is the precedence given to the presentation
of the prosecution case and the opportunity for the prosecutor to
conclude. This depends on the prevailing responsibility for the case
against the accused to be established to the satisfaction of the court in
order that the accused should be required to answer.67 In civil law
procedure the inquisition is finalised through the trial whereas the role of
the prosecutor in an adversarial trial is to establish all elements of the
charge within the trial.
Any synthesis of prosecutorial procedure would need to encounter:
— the differing investigative roles, and prosecutorial powers;
— the relationship between the procurator and the tribunal,
particularly at the investigation stage;
— the nature of evidence on which the prosecution relies; and
— the pre-eminence of the prosecutor in the theatre of the trial.
Synthesis in the Presentation of Evidence
The form and presentation of evidence before the trial is an area where
considerable difference exists between procedural traditions. Except at
the committal stage, evidence in common law trials is generally required
in the form of oral testimony from witnesses.68 In the civil law trial the
prosecution relies heavily on the written dossier presented as evidence,
and consisting of the record of the investigation.69
There is a heavy reliance on the oral testimony of witnesses before
international criminal tribunals.70 This is consistent with the desire, for
example, of the ICTY to represent the process of trial as publicly as
possible.71 The rules of the ICTY give entitlement to parties to call
witnesses.72
It is envisaged for the ICC that judges may give directions as to the
presentation of documentary evidence accumulated at the pre-trial stage
so long as it goes to ensure “that (trials) are conducted in a fair and
impartial manner”.73 There is also provision in the Trial Chambers of the
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74. SIT Rule 71.
75. SIC Art.64 (9)(a). This distinction may suggest that these determinations are not
mutually reliant.
76. SIC Art. 69 (4).
77. SIC Art. 69 (3).
78. SIC Art. 69 (7).
79. SIT Rule 66 (A).
80. SIT Rule 66 (C).
ICTY for the taking and introduction of depositions “in exceptional
circumstances and in the interests of justice”.74 Such caveats do not
necessarily apply to the status and production of depositions as part of the
dossier in the civil law trial.
It is envisaged that the Trial Chamber will have the power on the
application of any party to rule “on the admissibility and relevance of
evidence”.75 The probative value of the evidence and any prejudice such
evidence may cause to a fair trial (“or to the evaluation of the testimony of
a witness”) is also appropriate for judicial consideration in determining
admissibility or relevance.76 Further, the relevance of evidence (particu-
larly documentary in form) may be determined in terms of what the court
considers necessary for “the determination of the truth”.77 In fact, unlike
the case in many common law settings, the judge is given the power to
request the submission of all evidence it deems necessary for this purpose.
Finally, evidence obtained by means of a violation of the SIC or of
“internationally recognised human rights” shall not be admissible if the
reliability of the evidence is cast into “substantial doubt”, or admission of
the evidence would be “antithetical to and would seriously damage the
integrity of the proceedings”.78
An area where there has developed some interesting innovation within
international trial practice is the disclosure of evidence. For instance, in
the ICTY the prosecutor shall make available to the accused as soon as
practicable after his initial appearance “copies of the supportive material
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well
as all prior statements obtained by the prosecutor from the accused or
from prosecution witnesses”.79 This would seem to encompass statements
which were not to be used by the prosecution in their case, and if so it
would go well beyond general common law conventions for the disclosure
of the prosecution “brief”. Regarding the ICTY, the requirement for the
prosecution to disclose extends to the inspection of all documentation
and material evidence on which the prosecution will rely or which is
material to the preparation of the defence. The prosecutor may resist
disclosure if in his/her opinion it would be against the public interest to do
so, or it would prejudice an on-going investigation or the security interests
of any State. This is determined on application to the Trial Chamber.80
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81. SIT Rule 67 (A)(ii). Failure to disclose does not limit the right of the accused to utilise
the special defence.
82. In this respect it is not only the ideology of original procedural styles which is
challenged, but so too consistency with the ideology of the international tribunals.
83. SIT Rule 67 (C).
84. This, of course, highlights a common failing with expectations for disclosure: the party
on whom the obligation is placed is also the party likely to have special knowledge of what
should be disclosed. Therefore, the enforcement of disclosure obligations as of right from
the benefiting party may prove impossible.
85. SIT Rule 68.
86. Rule 70—Matters not subject to disclosure.
87. If such information is required for disclosure, the person providing confidential
information cannot be compelled as a witness to answer questions which he declines on the
basis of confidentiality—Rule 70 (D).
88. SIT Rule 90 (E). Interestingly, this stands in opposition to rights charters such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See how this stands against the
protections espoused in Rule 95.
It is in the area of reciprocal disclosure where procedures have become
unique. The prosecutor is required to notify the defence of the witnesses
who will be called to establish their case and to rebut any defences. The
defence on the other hand shall notify the prosecution of an alibi and “any
special defence (such as diminished responsibility) and the notification
shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses upon which the
accused intends to rely to establish the special defence”.81 Except in very
unusual circumstances this level and detail of disclosure clearly chal-
lenges the common law protections of the accused referred to earlier, and
is at the heart of the presumption of innocence.82 Even more extraordi-
nary in this context is the rule that if the defence applies for access to the
material evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely then
the prosecutor “shall be entitled to” any and all similar evidence in the
defence case.83 Also there is an ongoing duty on both parties to disclose
any evidence which later comes to their attention which should have been
disclosed under the rules.84
There is an overriding duty on the prosecutor to disclose any
exculpatory evidence; such that suggests the innocence of the accused “or
mitigates the guilt of the accused or may effect the credibility of the
prosecution evidence”.85 Such an obligation based on the subjective
assessment of a party to the proceedings no doubt will generate pre-trial
argument. In addition, it is entirely reliant on the integrity of the
prosecutor and points to the difficulty of the enforceability of such rules of
disclosure.
The issue of disclosure required by the ICTY is further complicated
through a detailed set of exclusions.86 These include internal memoranda
about the investigation, and certain information delivered in confi-
dence.87 Witnesses may be compelled to answer even self-incriminating
questions but if so they have immunity from further prosecution on this
evidence except for perjury.88
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89. SIT Rule 85.
90. The Transcript of this judgment is particularly enlightening from a procedural point of
view due to the 10 page procedural background which plots the interactions in the Tribunal
through the pre-trial and trial phases.
Concerning the presentation of evidence, the international tribunals
propose and practice procedures drawn from both original styles. For
instance, the ICTY prioritises the prosecution case, allows for evidence in
rebuttal and rejoinder, and judicial questioning at any time. Evidence is
elicited from witnesses through examination in chief, cross-examination
and re-examination. The accused may appear as a witness in his own
defence, but is not so required.89 The decision rests with the accused as
does the positioning of his evidence within the defence case. It can be
assumed that the evidence of the accused may be presented in any form
which is provided for any witness before the Tribunal.
Any synthesis of procedures for the presentation of evidence would
need to address:
— the significance of documentary and dispositional evidence as
compared with the evidence of witnesses before the Trial
Chamber;
— the influence of Pre-trial Chamber decisions over the form and
future of evidence;
— the role of the prosecutor and the judge in the production and
presentation of evidence;
— the extent and direction of disclosure obligations;
— the compatibility between ideological principles such as the
presumption of innocence and the status of disclosure
obligations;
— requirements regarding the compellability of witnesses;
— the place of the accused as witness;
— the determination of admissibility against over-arching require-
ments for fair trial; and
— the purpose of evidence elicited within the trial.
INSIGHTS FROM THE TADIC TRIAL
THE trial of Dusko Tadic before the ICTY provides a unique insight into
the procedural integration of trial practice at an international level.90 It
was the first completed full trial for the Tribunal, and one of its longest to
date and most complex in a procedural sense. Because of its formative
nature the pre-trial and trial deliberations provoked a range of defi-
nitional and practical problems which reveal much about the challenge of
integration in the early days of a permanent international jurisdiction.
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91. It may be argued that this failure to direct as to the constituent elements of very wide
and as yet ill-defined offences may have been a reason for the need to amend the indictment
prior to trial, and why there was some criticism of the manner in which the prosecutors were
forced to rely on broad time periods for the establishment of certain charges.
Reflecting on the purposes for this paper, the Tadic trial (and the
pre-trial procedures) reveal the importance of discretion and interpret-
ation for practice, where the different positions of players and their
decisions indicate potentials for procedural synthesis, and impediments
to its realisation. Original procedures and practices emerged from the
necessities of the trial, carrying so many political expectations.
The intervention of the trial chamber was evident and active in the trial
and pre-trial phases. Not only did this involve judicial direction and
rulings, but more managerial control over the evolution of the trial. For
instance, the judges seemed to rely on status conferences for the purposes
of rule interpretation prior to the commencement of the trial. This went
well beyond responding to the intercessions and motions of the parties to
the trial. On one occasion, for example, the judges corresponded with the
parties setting out a number of points that the chamber wanted
considered by them before the trial commenced. As the transcript
identifies:
This being the first full trial conducted by the International Tribunal, and in
view of the fact that counsel came from a variety of national jurisdictions,
the Trial Chamber sought to involve the parties in discussion of the
practical and procedural aspects of the trial.
This was a closed session to discuss matters such as discovery, translation
of documents, use of courtroom technology for the display of exhibits,
questions of identification, the status of co-accused, the need for pre-trial
briefs and the issues they should address, financial arrangements for
defence counsel, co-operation of State authorities with both the defence
and prosecution, practical arrangements for protected witnesses within
the courtroom, and the implication of live broadcasting of proceedings for
these witnesses.
Following this status conference the court issued a range of orders
concerning the obligations of the parties and these were the subject of
motions from both sides. In particular the prosecution filed to compel the
defence to disclose their witness statements. This was later denied.
Due to the formative nature of the indictment process, and the charges
on which this indictment rested, the parties sought some direction from
the judges prior to the trial regarding the elements of the offences and
their constituents. Interestingly, the Chamber refused to provide direc-
tion as to interpretation, instructing the parties instead that these issues
could be dealt with in their opening statements. In this situation the
judges chose not to be interventionist.91
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92. See, Rule 96 (1). The Chamber argued that the impact of this rule went way beyond
what is allowed in common law traditions.
An interesting procedural issue revealing the potential influence of
division between the two original procedural styles, and the manner in
which this can be reconciled, focused on corroboration. The defence
contended that in civil law, as distinct from common law, some degree of
independent causal corroboration of evidence is required. Further, it was
argued that this approach should be applied in cases before the Tribunal
in order to meet what the defence asserted were fair and settled standards
of proof, rather than developing what they described as “ad hoc standards
to enable [the Tribunal] to convict”. In answering this submission the
Chamber reverted to the Rules enabling the application of any relevant
evidence having probative value, unless this value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure fair trial. The judges then adopted a
legalist interpretation of the rules wherein corroboration is only given
relevance in the context of sexual assault.92 They then took the view that
the defence assertions regarding the civil law position on corroboration
was not an accurate reflection of that position. By examining the position
in France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain it was
established to the Chamber’s satisfaction that there was no hard and fast
civil law position on corroboration. Rather, the judges concluded that it
was a developing principle over time which now largely rested on the
discretion of the trial judge, within these traditions. By taking this
approach of reading down the argument against the enabling instruments,
and the laws of certain jurisdictions, the Chamber avoided ruling on the
wider question of whether ascription to a particular procedural style was
the way to ensure standards of proof, or whether it was for the Tribunal to
create their own procedures and standards. This is certainly a question
which will arise again for argument. It is not limited to the interpretation
of particular evidentiary issues. Interestingly, in its concluding remarks
on this instance, the judges even invoked the position in hybrid
procedural systems beyond the civil and common law divide.
. . . this principle (of corroboration) does not exist in Marxist legal systems,
including those of the former Yugoslavia and China, which largely follow
the civil law principle of the freedom of evaluation of evidence.
Another significant issue where procedural compromise seems evident
arose from what the court considered was a lack of specificity in the
charges of the indictment. This might be seen as a factor of the very broad
crimes which are the remit of the Tribunal. It also might be due to the
novelty of the charges (and the indictment process) in this context. It
should be anticipated that as tribunal case experience develops so will the
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accuracy of the language of liability and the appreciation of the
necessities of proof which it requires.
In the situation of the Tadic defence this lack of specificity was
recognised as particularly telling. Aggravating this was the common
feature of any such investigation: problems with accumulating and
verifying evidence from foreign theatres of military conflict where
witnesses may be victims and where emotions and loyalties remain
fiercely divided.
In the face of almost all the counts of the indictment the accused
countered with an alibi defence. The Chamber recognised:
The difficulty of establishing an alibi defence for those paragraphs [of the
indictment] that cover long periods of time is appreciated. In regard to
those paragraphs, a major cause of difficulty for the defence lies, however,
in the very special character of its alibi defence, which not only has to
extend over many months but also does not involve anything like a total
absence from the region where the offences are alleged to have occurred.
The Trial Chamber preferred to treat this as a peculiar problem with the
Tadic defence. It failed to recognise that the difficulty in invoking any of
the limited range of defences available to accused who come before the
tribunal will be exacerbated by the breadth of indictments, the nature of
the offences, and the concessions required by the terrain and context of
the investigation.
The Tribunal identified several problematic evidentiary issues in this
case which may also signpost areas of dissonance and synthesis:
— access to evidence
— lack of specificity in charges
— corroboration
— victims of the conflict as witnesses
— identification evidence
— testimony of hostile witnesses
— hearsay.
EUROPEAN FAIR TRIAL JURISPRUDENCE—A CONTEXT FOR SYNTHESIS
RECENT developments from the European Court of Human Rights in the
interpretation of Article 6 may further enable internationalised pro-
cedural synthesis through an expansion of the notion of fair trial.
Article 6 requires that for the determination of the civil rights and
obligations of persons before the criminal courts, or of any criminal
charge laid against a person, “everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law”. For the Convention the essential compo-
nents of fairness in a trial are:
— right of access to a properly constituted court;
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93. As enunciated in Golder v. United Kingdom (1975) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 para.36.
94. Grosz, J., Beatson, J. & Duffy, P., (2000) Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the
European Convention, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.221.
95. Any restrictions must not be such that “the very essence of the right is impaired.
Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a
legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved”; see, Ashingdane v. United Kingdom
(1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 528 para.57.
— a public hearing;
— in a reasonable time;
— with a public pronouncement of judgment;
— a guarantee of the presumption of innocence;
— being promptly informed of the accusations and in a language of
the accused’s comprehension;
— to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;
— to defend himself or through legal assistance, given free as the
interests of justice require;
— to examine or have examined witnesses against him, and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf, and
— to have the free assistance of an interpreter when required.
The rights endorsed around the fair trial notion in Article 6 take two
directions:
1. General principles of procedural fairness supporting the presumption of
innocence;
2. Minimum protections for the accused.
There is little in this version of fair trial which relates to participants
beyond the accused (such as victims, witnesses, the prosecutor or the
judge), despite the assumption that it is for the courts and the community
to oversee these essential procedural components. The language of the
rights created in the Article anticipates access to justice through the
courts, requirements for the conduct and composition of the court, and a
set of guarantees concerning the conduct of proceedings.93 This language
incorporates what has been referred to as “traditional civil rights in
criminal proceedings”94 as well as certain contested matters yet to be
resolved in case law.
On the issue of rights of access to the court, this appears to be general.
The right may be waived, for instance, through plea-bargaining. Access
relates to all stages of the legal proceedings although it may be subject to
limitations95 (such as public interest immunity, and retrospective legis-
lation). Obviously the existence and form of legal aid in a jurisdiction will
vitally affect the reality of access to trial, and the nature of that access.
Article 6(3)(c) seems to provide for free legal assistance when the
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99. Grosz (et al.) op. cit. pp.245–246.
100. Kaufman v. Belgium (1986) 50 D.&R. 98.
interests of justice so require. However, the circumstances of each case
may tend to qualify this right. It is for the court to determine the merits of
any application for free assistance.
The tribunal before which the charge is heard must be independent and
impartial. These requirements apply as much to jurors as to professional
judges.96 And it is for the judges to ensure this. The requirements
concerning independence and impartiality obviously spill over into the
pre-trial phase.
The court is generally obliged to conduct proceedings so as to ensure a
fair hearing. The difficulty here is that without a definition of a fair trial
within the Convention it is unclear how this notion underlies the broad
and specific rights contained in Article 6. A trial may not conform to a
general standard of fairness even if the minimum rights guaranteed in
paragraph (3) have been respected.97 Interestingly, however, it would
appear that the court will not engage in a detailed examination of the
paragraph (3) guarantees if it can safely conclude that overall the accused
has had a fair or unfair hearing.98 If the accused’s complaint does not
invoke any of the specific guarantees then the case as a whole will be
considered, even where the disputed incident is the turning point of the
claim as to unfairness. This allows for the rejection of procedural flaws
that do not produce unfairness, or where the flaw has been cured by a
higher court. It may also allow for the aggregation of a series of
shortcomings any of which may not constitute unfairness.
The Convention organs have relied on general rights to a fair hearing in
order to articulate more specific rights. These include the right to
adversarial proceedings, the right to equality of arms, the right to be
present, the right to know the grounds on which the court’s decisions are
based, the rights to remain silent and against self incrimination, and
access to necessary information for a defence.99 Despite the absence of
direct reference to the issue in Article 6, the court is also taking a
supervisory position on the fairness of taking evidence.
The principle of equality of arms means a person must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to a court under conditions
which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage in relation to his
opponent.100 This principle encapsulates the rights of access, information,
confrontation, and representation, and has been invoked in the ECHR
over issues such as failure to furnish documents to a party, failure to give
reasons, refusal to admit evidence, and the use of court appointed experts.
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101. Murray v. UK (1996) 22 E.H.R.R 29 para. 45.
102. Saunders v. UK (1996) 23 E.H.R.R 313, held that the right to silence may not operate
to prevent the compulsory obtaining (as opposed to use) of evidence during the
investigation of company offences.
103. Eckle v. Germany (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 1 para. 80.
104. See, Saunders v. UK op. cit., where allegations of a racist jury were said to deny the
impartiality of the tribunal and therefore challenge the presumption of innocence.
105. See, Austria v. Italy (1963) 6 Y.B. 740.
106. See, Salabiaku v. France (1988) 13 E.H.R.R 379.
The right to remain silent, and the privilege against self incrimination,
while not specifically referred to in Article 6, have been implied from
recognised international standards as lying “at the heart of the notion of
fair procedure under Article 6”.101 They apply to all forms of crime and
are not automatically qualified by appeal to the public interest in the
prosecution of serious or complex offences. Despite the link with the
presumption of innocence, these principles and their violation are
considered against the overall fairness of the trial. In essence these rights
protect the accused from improper compulsion by the authorities which
may lead to miscarriages of justice. The right to silence is not absolute102
and courts might legitimately draw inferences from the silence of the
accused.
The right to a hearing within a reasonable time relies on the
determination of reasonableness on a case by case basis. The courts, in
making such a determination, will have regard to the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the accused and the competent authorities.103 As for
public hearings and the public pronouncement of judgment, rendering
the administration of justice as visible is seen to guarantee one of the
fundamental principles of a democratic society as conceived by the
Convention. Unless there are exceptional circumstances these rights
envisage an oral hearing as well. Publicity for judicial hearings are subject
to certain specified exceptions such as those pertaining to the trial of
young people. This is also the case with the public pronouncement of
judgment.
The presumption of innocence has some connection to considerations
of the impartiality of the court.104 Also the presumption is a justification
for Article 6(2) placing the onus of proof on the prosecution. The burden
of proof here is not clear,105 and strict liability offences as well as those
where the onus may be reversed can be tolerated as exceptions.106
Particular procedural rights such as adequate time to prepare a
defence; the right to be informed of charges promptly and intelligibly; the
right to a personal defence and legal representation; the right to confront
witnesses; and the right to an interpreter, substantiate the general right to
an adequate defence. This has promoted more specific rights such as
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110. Arising as they do out of international organisations and multilateral agreements
which similarly foster and rely on rights conventions.
111. The new human rights legislation in England has thrown into stark relief certain
investigation and trial practice. The French have recently reviewed their criminal procedure
against the European Human Rights Convention and preferred to retain contradictory
features.
112. Such as the qualification of the rule against self-incrimination.
prosecutorial disclosure,107 effective legal assistance,108 and the right to
witness protection.109 These in turn feature prominently in the foundation
instruments of the international tribunals.
PROSPECTS FOR SYNTHESIS?
THE ideology governing international criminal tribunals is that which
identifies “fair trial”. The “rights-based” language elaborating on “fair-
ness” is consistent and compatible with the political origins of the
tribunals,110 but may not sit well with the recent development of common
law and civil law procedural traditions.111 In both styles there prevails
some confusion about rights protection: where do the victim and the
accused person stand relative to each other and the interests of the State?
But this is not just an issue where the original procedural styles need to
embrace the fair trial notion for synthesis to be possible. Problems exist in
the translation of “fairness” even at the international level. For instance,
one might assume that access-to-justice issues are synonymous measures
of fairness. Yet, beyond general concerns for the representation of the
accused, and the presentation of his case, access is not an important
feature of the enabling instruments for international tribunals. Further,
these instruments (and the trial practice which they promote) are replete
with some of the contradictions which challenge access and fairness in the
originating styles.112 As well, international trial practice seems to have
created new conditions (such as the extent and obligations for disclosure)
which may confuse the status and directions of rights and fairness within
the trial context.
There can be no doubt that, in order for synthesis at the level of
ideology, the challenge of fair trial requirements must be addressed. And
this needs to be done being aware of, and resistant to, the common and
civil law procedural practice to speak one language when it comes to
principle and to tolerate contradiction without challenging that principle.
Access to justice is a means whereby the “fair trial” formula may be
more universal. Fair trial concerns should identify points of connection
between the professional and lay participants in the trial, at crucial
situations of access. Legal representation and the interaction between the
advocate and the accused are examples of this. At the international level
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the issue may be communication rather than availability of represen-
tation and this may inform comparable access debates in local jurisdic-
tions which tend to focus on service availability rather than delivery.
The nature, quality and availability of legal representation are crucial
to the fair trial from the perspective of the accused. But representation, or
the lack of it, may not merely be evaluated in terms of legal aid
mechanisms, or principles of equality of arms. With international
tribunals, legal representation is guaranteed, but the divisions of lan-
guage, culture and experience between the accused and his counsel may
qualify the actuality of representation and hence access. In addition, the
nature of the charges indicted from international jurisdictions, the limited
available defences, and the acceptance of factual generality in estab-
lishing either could create conditions where access to the real “defence”
of a fair trial may be reduced.
In addition to the perspectives of access, and situations of connection,
research must examine features of trial practice considered crucial to
access. These would include prosecutorial issues, mode of trial issues,
remand issues, and sentencing issues. They then would be subdivided for
analysis in both local and international trial settings. For instance,
considerations of the prosecution, sufficiency of evidence, public interest
and accountability, disclosure protocols, delay, principles of diversion,
governance of evidence delivery etc., are likely to be crucial as they
impact on access.
Fair trial will be a measure both for the uniqueness of internationalised
trial procedure, and the manner in which it merges and elaborates on
competing procedural styles. This is already happening when one
considers the status and protection of the victim/witness. The develop-
ment of the internationalised fair trial will be dependant, however, on
better actualising many of the accused’s rights which are exercising the
judicial minds at the ECHR.
Synthesis of institutional and procedural form is a reality in the
international tribunals because of the necessity to run trials and to run
them in public view using the same professional and lay players who
feature in the common law and civil law styles. Interestingly, it seems that
in trial practice the synthesis takes the form of compromise, and
procedural difference (or claims back to comfort in either of the
originating traditions) are arbitrated by the trial chamber. To this extent,
synthesis is a necessary feature of trial practice but it operates within an
over-riding potential to claim and activate procedural (and interpret-
ative) difference.
The extent to which such difference will feature in international trial
practice is modified by both the relative novelty of the process and the
limited, unique and generalised indictments which are the substance of
the trial. Were the matters before trial chambers to be of the type more
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likely to be settled in common or civil law (and the procedure for their
prosecution or defence more recognised and clear) then instances of
difference would also be more apparent, and no doubt more openly
contested.
Synthesis also appears through predominance. In the international
criminal trial it is essential (for the symbolic significance of the event at
least) that as much of the process as possible be public. For the purpose of
the spectacle, and that the interest of the observer should be retained,
witnesses rather than documents reveal the evidence in question.
With the predominance of oral testimony as the source of evidence, the
rules for its delivery and admissibility are more likely to link back to a
procedural style which shares the significance of the witness (the common
law). Therefore, the enabling instruments and trial practice of inter-
national criminal tribunals seem governed by English/American rules of
evidence.
It is difficult to speculate on the “cult” of personality in the process of
synthesis. However, two conditions present suggesting that strong judges
and prosecutors in particular, from either tradition, will have a major
impact on synthesis and difference. First there is the importance of the
professional within the trial. International criminal procedure continues
to celebrate the place of the prosecutor and the judge in running the trial.
International pre-trial and trial practice suggests that interventionist
judges in particular are having an impact on what procedural outcomes
feature. This is not only because the statutes allow the trial chamber to
assume significant governance over the trial. It is anticipated in the way
the roles and powers of international judges and prosecutors are
constructed that discretion (the second condition) will be as, if not more
important than it is in either originating procedural style.
The nature of originating instruments for the international trial
institutions should not be ignored as an influence for synthesis. The more
pragmatic approach adopted by the ICTY under its relative skeletal
Statute and Rules may not be preferred by the ICC with its more detailed
and inclusive instruments. Even so, the nature of broad generic offences
as the jurisdiction for all internationalised courts, and the enforced blend
of procedural traditions, professional preferences and practical ex-
perience will generate a common atmosphere of compromise and
pragmatism.
The limited observations on procedure and trial practice in this paper
suggest that synthesis at the international level is a matter of convenience,
or at least compliance rather than any recognition or commitment to a
new compatibility. The political imperatives fuelling the international
tribunals (and the moves towards an international criminal court) are not
tolerant of disparate procedural niceties standing in the way of trial
outcomes. Therefore, what now seems to be a triumph for synthesis may
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be more reliant on the political moment of internationalisation rather
than on any real and significant developments towards a new, fused
procedural tradition. Perhaps the test for whether this will occur as a
result of internationalisation is the evidence of synthesis within the
originating procedural styles as they develop and continue to operate in
their home jurisdictions.
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